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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Martinez appeals from his conviction for felony DUI, challenging the district
court’s grant of the State’s motion in limine.  In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Martinez argued
the district court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion because it erred in
concluding that evidence of intermediate drinking (i.e., drinking after driving, but before
measurement of the blood alcohol level) is irrelevant under a per se theory of DUI.  The
State does not address Mr. Martinez’s argument in its brief.  Instead, it argues only that
Mr. Martinez has “failed to address the district court’s holding” and thus “has failed to
preserve his appellate claim of error.”  (Resp. Br., p.4.)  The State is incorrect.  The
district court granted the State’s motion in limine because it concluded that where, as
here, the State is proceeding solely under a per se theory, any evidence of intermediate
drinking is irrelevant and a test result demonstrating an alcohol concentration in excess
of the legal limit is conclusive proof of the offense.  The district court’s ruling was
erroneous as a matter of law and the court abused its discretion in granting the State’s
motion in limine.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Martinez included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his
appellant’s brief, see App. Br., pp.1-4, and incorporates that statement by reference
herein.  He includes this section only to respond to a single “fact” set forth by the State
in its brief, and to address a critical portion of the procedural history in this case.
The State asserts that after the witness who observed Mr. Martinez driving
followed him into the trailer park, “[Mr.] Martinez entered his residence ‘for a second’
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before he re-emerged and threw a can of Red Bull at [the witness’s] car.”  (Resp.
Br., p.1.)  Mr. Martinez disputes that he was in in his residence for only “a second.”  At
the sentencing hearing, the district court recognized that the critical period of time in
which Mr. Martinez could have engaged in intermediate drinking in his residence was
fourteen minutes.  (7/1/16 Tr., p.19, Ls.6-21.)
The State asserts in its brief that the district court granted the State’s motion in
limine “holding that evidence and argument regarding post-driving drinking was
inadmissible in the absence of expert testimony regarding how any alleged consumption
of alcohol after driving but before being tested would have affected the test.”  (Resp.
Br., p.2.)  As discussed in more detail below, this was not the district court’s holding.
The district court held that, under its reading of the case law, evidence of intermediate
drinking is not relevant where the State is proceeding solely under a per se theory of
DUI.  (5/17/16 Tr., p.12, L.11 – p.13, L.25.)  The district court told counsel for
Mr. Martinez, “[Y]our expert testimony can attack the results of the tests by showing it
was not an appropriate test, not properly administered, any such thing.  But as far as
extrapolating back on the theory, on the [per] se theory, it’s simply not allowed.”
(5/17/16 Tr., p.13, Ls.20-25.)  On the issue presented in the State’s motion in limine, the
district court found the law to be “very, very crystal clear.”  (5/17/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.3-6.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the State’s motion in limine?
4
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Granted The State’s Motion In Limine
In his appellant’s brief, Mr. Martinez argued he should have been allowed to
present evidence and argue that his elevated blood alcohol level proved only that he
was parked while intoxicated, not that he was driving while intoxicated, which does not
constitute a violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a).  (App. Br., pp.6-9.)  The State does
not address this argument in its brief, but asserts only that this Court “must affirm”
because “[r]eview of the record shows that Martinez has not challenged the actual basis
articulated by the district court for not admitting evidence of post-driving consumption of
alcohol.”  (Resp. Br., p.5.)  The State is mistaken.
The district court orally granted the State’s motion in limine on what would have
been the first day of trial, and then proceeded to accept Mr. Martinez’s conditional guilty
plea.  (See generally 5/17/16 Tr.)  In explaining its decision, the district court first
admonished the State because its motion “was untimely.”  (5/17/16 Tr., p.4, Ls.18-19.)
The district court then stated it “can certainly discuss the motion” because “the law is
very, very crystal clear on the subject.”  (5/17/16 Tr., p.5, Ls.3-6.)  The district court
explained that under State v. Tomlinson, 357 P.3d 238 (Ct. App. 2015), the State can
proceed under a per se theory of DUI on the blood test alone.  (5/17/16 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-
23.)  Counsel for Mr. Martinez asked the district court to clarify its holding, stating, “I
guess, Judge, if you could clarify for me . . . so you’re saying, even if we had all the
expert testimony in the world prepared, [Mr. Martinez’s] testimony that he consumed
alcohol subsequent to driving would not be allowed under Tomlinson?”  (5/17/16 Tr.,
p.12, L.24 – p.13, L.4.)  The district court responded, “Under Tomlinson, the—what the
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State is required to prove is the alcohol concentration at the time the test was taken.
And that is conclusive, not presumptive on the per se theory.  That’s correct.”  (5/17/16
Tr., p.13, Ls.5-9.)
Later at this same hearing, defense counsel stated, “So if that’s the Court’s
holding, we would prefer to a do a Rule 11, preserve our right to appeal that issue . . .
rather than sit through three days of trial just to preserve our right to appeal.”  (5/17/16
Tr., p.16, L.19 – p.17, L.2.)  The district court asked what for the State’s position and the
prosecutor responded, “That’s fine.  Open rec’s.”  (5/17/16 Tr., p.17, Ls.3-7.)  After
additional argument, defense counsel again asked the district court to clarify its holding.
(Tr., p.29, Ls.12-13.)  The district court said:
Well, my ruling is he could present testimony and evidence as to such
intervening drinking.  But in order for that to have any relevance
whatsoever, there has to be expert testimony [presumably about the
reliability of the test itself].  So I’m not going to preclude what he wants to
offer as evidence, but you’re not going to argue or, you know, this
intervening drinking as blood alcohol level would have been lower . . .
unless you have an expert to support that.
(5/17/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.3-12.)
In  its  brief,  the  State  points  to  this  last  statement  from  the  district  court  and
characterizes it as an alternative holding.  (Resp. Br., p.5.)  The parties did not appear
to treat it this way in the district court.  On the contrary, the parties appeared to believe
that, in stating it would permit some expert testimony, the district court was referring to
expert testimony challenging the administration of the test itself, as it had referred to
earlier in its ruling.  At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the district court
confirmed that Mr. Martinez had entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to
appeal from the district court’s grant of the State’s motion in limine.  (7/1/6 Tr., p.1, L.25
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– p.2, L.14.)  The prosecutor said he understood Mr. Martinez “can appeal that
decision.”  (7/1/16 Tr., p.2, Ls.15-16.)  As reflected in the Notice of Appeal, Mr. Martinez
understood the issue he would raise on appeal was whether the district court erred in
precluding him from testifying regarding intermediate alcohol consumption, and whether
Tomlinson is applicable to a DUI case involving intermediate consumption of alcohol.
(R., pp.99-102.)
The district court granted the State’s motion in limine because it concluded that
any testimony or evidence that Mr. Martinez consumed alcohol between driving and the
administration of a breath alcohol test is not relevant under a per se theory of DUI.
(5/17/16 Tr., p.12, Ls.18-23.)  Mr. Martinez submits the district court would have
permitted expert testimony challenging the administration of the blood alcohol test itself,
but not any argument or testimony, expert or otherwise, regarding intermediate drinking.
This Court should consider the merits of the issue presented in this appeal and, for the
reasons stated in Mr. Martinez’s appellant’s brief, reverse the district court’s grant of the
State’s motion in limine.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his appellant’s brief,
Mr. Martinez respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the
district court’s grant of the State’s motion in limine, and remand this case to the district
court for further proceedings.
DATED this 27th day of January, 2017.
___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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